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Abstract
We consider a model for decision making based on an adaptive, k–period, learn-
ing process where the priors are selected according to Von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility principle. A preference relation between two prospects is intro-
duced, depending on which prospect is selected more often. We show that the
new preferences have similarities with the preferences obtained by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) in the context of the prospect theory. Additionally, we establish
that in the limit of large learning period k, the new preferences coincide with the
expected utility principle.
Keywords: Relative payoff sums, adaptive decision making, expected utility
principle
1. Introduction
The expected utility theory (EUT) was put forward by Von Neumann andMor-
genstern (1947) as a mathematical formalization of the way the choices are made
between the prospects involving objective, probabilistic outcomes. The theory de-
rives a utility functionU (VNM utility) which assigns values to the payoffs and is
used to rank prospects according to the expectation E[U(X)],where X is a random
variable of payoffs of a given prospect.
As a theory, EUT starts with the set of axioms, called axioms of choice that
one has to adhere in assigning the preferences to prospects. They are the com-
pleteness, transitivity, continuity and independence (substitution) axioms. The last
axioms drew a significant amount of critique from the experimentalists, starting
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with Allais (1953). Over the years several alternative utility theories were pro-
posed that provide some variants of the expected utility without the independence
axiom or with its weaker version. Among them, the generalized expected utility
of Machina (1982), weighted utility theory of Chew and MacCrimmon (1979), the
regret theory developed independently by Bell (1982), Fishburn (1982), Loomis
and Sugden (1982), rank dependent utility theory of Quiggin (1982, 1993), and
the dual utility theory by Yaari (1987).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984, 1992) introduced framing effects, value
functions, and probability weights into the analysis and incorporated them into the
prospect theory that was later developed, using the approach of the rank dependent
utility theory, into the cumulative prospect theory.
In this paper we will consider the deviations from the EU principle due to
response to the current incentives, as modeled by a reinforcement learning mech-
anism. Rather than postulating axioms of choice we will postulate the type of
behavior that directs an agent to a particular choice, and derive the preferences
for prospects from that. What we have in mind here is a reactive response to
outcomes, as seen, for example, when people are rushing to buy flood insurance
just after a historic flood, and then, canceling it in a few years. To an objec-
tivist, who believes in statistical statements like “1 in 100 years flood plan,” this
behavior is “irrational.” However if a degree of uncertainty about the future is
allowed (weather pattern is changing) the better name for it is “adaptive,” which,
when coupled with a learning process that accounts for accumulating experience,
represents a ubiquitous behavioral pattern.
The relevance of such behaviors for the problems in Economics has always
been acknowledged. A systematic approach has been developed by Cross in the
monograph “A theory for adaptive economic behavior” (1983). In that work, the
author analyzes stochastic models for the decision making built on the princi-
ples of the learning theory laid out by Bush and Mosteller (1951, 1955). Agents
actions evolve through a feedback mechanism that updates the choice probabili-
ties. The focus is on the properties of choice and behavior in the transient regime
(called disequilibrium), starting at the moment when the exogenous parameters
have changed, and prior to the moment the rational equilibrium is reached in the
long run.
In this paper we will extend the Cross’ theory to describe the preferences for
risky prospects that can be associated with adaptive behavior. This is done by
changing the feedback model of Cross to a short-term memory model, when the
actions are determined only from few previous experiences. The approach allows
us to derive exact expressions for preferences and compare them with the prefer-
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ences based on the Expected Utility principle.
The new type of preferences will be build upon an agent’s VNM utility func-
tion U and the expected utilities of prospects, calculated according to EUT. We
will assume that the agent does rank prospects according to EU, but the agent’s
actions are not determined solely by the expected utilities. They rather depend
on the combination of factors expressed by the level of stimulus (propensity) for
selecting a prospect. The stimulus for a prospect will be defined as a sum of the
“default level of stimulus” (stimulus prior), expressed by its expected utility and
the increments, denominated in the units of the utility function, from the most
recent payoffs the prospect paid out. At this point, it is best to think of a dynamic
(iterated) decision making process, in which the agent constantly updates her atti-
tude toward the prospects. Given the stimuli for prospects, the agent chooses the
prospect with a probability, defined as a fraction of the prospect stimuli to the total
stimuli of all prospect. The new preference relation between two prospects La and
Lb is defined by a ranking based on which prospect is selected more often in a long
run of choices. We will call such relation RPS (relative payoff sum) preferences,
in analogy the learning algorithm, introduced by Harley (1981) in the context of
the Game Theory. In that filed, the relation between the reinforcement learning
and optimal strategies was studied by Roth and Erev (1995, 1998), Bo¨rgers and
Sarin (1995, 1997), Erev and Roth (1996), and Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
The new preferences are derived by including adaptation mechanism into de-
cision making. In the view of this, it is particular interesting to see that RPS
preferences follow the pattern of violations to the EU theory observed experimen-
tally. Namely, RPS preferences are non-linear, in way similar to the preferences
in Allais’ paradox. They are frame dependent, and the risk attitude, in comparison
to the EU risk attitude, changes from more risky to more conservative, as payoffs
shift from losses to gains.
2. RPS models of decision making
To motivate the new type of the preferences we consider the decision making
as a dynamics “learning process”. Given the choice between two prospects (lot-
teries) La and Lb, an agent uses her VNM utility function to compute the expected
utilities Ua and Ub to compare the prospects. Suppose now that the agent has to
select a prospect on a regular basis. Even though the agent has a preference for
one, she might be influenced by a variety of other factors (mood, peer-pressure,
fashion trends, etc.) to select less preferred prospect at a given instant of time.
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Those factors are not included in the evaluation of the utility, because, typically,
they are too complex to account for and/or unpredictable.
A customary approach to model this situation is to assume that the agent fol-
lows a mixed strategy, by selecting one prospect or another with a certain proba-
bility, which, in the view of the given conditions, can be set to be the proportion
of utilities, i.e. the probability to select prospect La is determined by the ratio
Ua
Ua +Ub
. (1)
In this way both prospects are being repeatedly selected. The important property
of such dynamic decision process is its consistency with the EU principle: the
prospect that is selected most often is the prospect with the higher expected utility.
To model the deviations from the EU principle, we will assume that the agent
adjusts the probability (1) from one decision to another depending on the history
of realized payoffs. The adjustment is modeled by a positive/negative reinforce-
ment mechanism.
First, we consider the reinforcement model determined only by the last payoff.
2.1. RPS(1) preferences
To simplify the presentation, we consider lotteries with non-negative payoffs
first, and relax this condition in subsequent sections.
Let Pia, P
i
b be the payoffs from lotteries La and Lb at epoch i. The reinforcement
mechanism is defined through the stimuli (propensities) to select La and Lb at the
next epoch i+1. They are set to be proportional to the utilities of the last payoff:
Si+1a =Ua +U(P
i
a), (2)
Si+1b =Ub +U(P
i
b), (3)
where, we set expression U(Pia), or U(P
i
b), to zero if the lottery is not selected.
Ua, Ub are the default levels of the stimuli. At the next epoch the agent executes a
mixed strategy by selecting lottery La with the decision probability
λ i+1a =
Si+1a
Si+1a +S
i+1
b
. (4)
Once the lottery is selected, the payoff is determined by a random sampling of
lottery La or Lb.
We will call rule (2)–(4) the relative payoff sum (or RPS(1)) decision making
model, following the nomenclature introduced by Harley (1981). Note that this
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model is a short memory model, unlike most of the learning models considered in
the literature cited in the Introduction.
In the course of repeated choices the agent will keep switching between two
lotteries. A statistically minded agent however, will notice that one lottery is being
selected more often than the other. With more choices made, this observation gets
re-confirmed.
It leads to a preference relation, La ≻ Lb, defined by the rule that lottery La
is selected, in the long run, more often than Lb, when the decisions are made
according to the rule (2)–(4).
As shown in Appendix, the mathematical equivalent of this definition is in-
equality
E
[
Ub
Ua +Ub +U(X)
]
< E
[
Ua
Ua +Ub +U(Y )
]
, (5)
where X is a random payoff corresponding to lottery La and Y is that of Lb. We
call this relation RPS(1) preferences. These preferences can also be interpreted
as “expected decision probability” principle, according to formula (9) from Ap-
pendix.
In terms of the agent’s cognition, new preferences correspond to the following
mental math calculations: “To select between La and Lb, I will compare my aver-
age willingness to repeat the same choice next time if I selected each lottery now
and observed its payoff.”
Here, by “willingness” we understand the decision probability (4) calculated
from the ratio of stimuli. Clearly, this rule is not restricted to the iterated deci-
sion making scenario described above, but can be deliberated even when one-time
decisions are made.
RPS(1) preferences differ form the corresponding EU preferences. This, and
other properties, are discussed below, but a quick example can help to illustrate
it. Consider a lottery that pays out $100 for sure and a lottery that pays out $0
and $200 with 50/50 chances. If the agent is risk neutral, with the linear utility
U(x) = x, then she is indifferent between two lotteries in EU preferences, but
according to RPS(1)-rule (5), the sure bet is more attractive to her.
We list below the properties of RPS(1) preferences that follow directly from
the definition, with explanations provided in Appendix.
a. RPS(1) preferences are not invariant under the shifts of the utility function
from U(x) to U(x)+ a. They exhibit the framing effect. This property is
considered in more details in section 2.3.
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b. Given the priors Ua and Ub, RPS(1) preferences depend on wealth incre-
ments, not the total accumulated wealth.
c. RPS(1) preferences are not transitive.
d. RPS(1) preferences violate the independence axiom.
e. RPS(1) preferences verify first order stochastic dominance (FSD) principle.
2.2. Independence Axiom and Allais experiment
We illustrate the failure of the independence axiom on the following numerical
example. Consider a concave VNMutilityU(c)= (1+c).2−1, normalized so that
U(0) = 0. Denote by Lˆc the lottery that pays $c for sure, and by Lx the one that
pays $0 with probability 1− x and $1 with probability x. We compare lotteries
Lc and Lx by RPS(1)-rule. The result is represented graphically in figure 1. The
dashed line divides the unit square into two parts: below the line, the certain bet
Lˆc ≻ Lx, above, Lx ≻ Lˆc, and the line itself is the indifference curve (certainty
equivalent curve).
Similar to Allais experiment, we mix each lottery, Lx and Lˆc, with 80% chance
of lottery L0 which pays $0 for sure. In violation of the independence axiom, the
preference change: the solid line in figure 1 is the new indifference curve. In the
region between the two lines Lˆc ≻ Lx, but 0.2Lx +0.8L0 ≻ 0.2Lˆc +0.8L0.
2.3. Losses and Gains
Consider now the situation when the wealth increments are framed as losses
(negative) or gains (positive). The decision rule (4) must be re-defined for ex-
pression (4) to be meaningful. An approach adopted in learning literature cited
in the Introduction is to use a positive, non-decreasing function, for example,
Φ(x) = ex/d , d > 0, and set
λ i+1a =
Φ(Si+1a )
Φ(Si+1a )+Φ(S
i+1
b ).
The preferences, that we still call RPS(1) preferences, are defined by inequality
E
[
Φ(Ub)
Φ(Ub)+Φ(Ua+U(X))
]
< E
[
Φ(Ua)
Φ(Ua)+Φ(Ub+U(Y ))
]
, (6)
when La ≻ Lb.
In this setting we are going to look at the problem of determining the certainty
equivalent for probabilistic lotteries involving positive or negative payoffs.
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Figure 1: Allais Paradox. The dashed line is the certainty equivalent for lottery Lx in RPS(1)
preferences, when VNM utility U(c) = (1− c)0.2− 1. The solid line represents the points (c,x)
for which lottery 0.2Lx+0.8L0∼ 0.2Lˆc+0.8L0. The region between the curves is set of points for
which Allais paradox holds.
As an example, we take logarithmic utilityU(c) = log(1+0.4c)/ log1.4, nor-
malized so that U(0) = 0, U(1) = 1. First we consider lottery Lx that pays $0
with probability 1− x and $1 with probability x. For each such lottery we find
its certainty equivalent $c according to RPS(1)-preferences. Figure 2 shows, by
the solid line, the corresponding indifference curve, in the first quadrant. Then,
we consider lotteries Lx that pay $0 with probability 1− x and U(−1) < 0 with
probability x. The solid line in the third quadrant is the indifference curve for
losses. For comparison we draw on the same figure the certainty equivalent curve
(dashed) according to the EU principle, which is simply the graph ofU(c).
As seen from that figure, the indifference curve for RPS(1)-preferences lies
aboveU(c) in the region of gains, and below it, for losses. Thus, an agent is more
risk averse, compared to the expected utility preferences, in gains, and more risk
tolerant in losses. It should be noted that the situation in figure 2 applies only
to two-valued lotteries described there. Since RPS(1) is not an expected utility
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no conclusions about other types of lotteries can be drawn from the graph of the
certainty equivalents of such lotteries. In particular, the type of convexity of the
certainty equivalent curve can not be used to characterize RPS(1) preferences in
the relation to the attitude toward risk.
However, as shown in Appendix, the following property is generic.
Lemma 1. Suppose that VNM utility is risk-neutral, U(x) = x, and let La be any
lottery, described by a payoff random variable X . Then, if X ≥ 0, the RPS(1)
certainty equivalent of La is less than the expected utility Ua = E[U(X)]. If X ≤ 0,
the RPS(1) certainty equivalent of La is greater than the expected utility Ua.
2.4. RPS(k)-preferences
A direct extension of the decision model (2)–(4) is a model in which an agent
accounts for the last k payoffs. The stimuli change, for example, by the average:
Si+1a =Ua +
1
nia
k−1
∑
j=0
U(Pi− ja ), (7)
Si+1b =Ub +
1
nib
k−1
∑
j=0
U(P
i− j
b ), (8)
where nia is the number of times lottery La has been selected during the last k
rounds, and similarly for nib. Again, we are using the convention that if La (Lb)
was not chosen at round i, then U(Pia) = 0 (U(P
i
b) = 0). The decision between
lotteries is made randomly with decision probability (4).
We define the preference relation La ≻ Lb if La is selected more often in a long
series of decision making, and refer to such preferences as RPS(k)-rule.
It is possible to develop a mathematical formalism similar to (5), however it is
outside of the scope of this work. Here, we would like to use RPS(k)-preferences
to a establish a connections between the adaptive decision making and the ex-
pected utility theory.
Consider RPS(k)-preferences with the memory extending to utmost past, that
is, k → +∞. In the limit, the average payoffs in (7), (8) become the expected
utilities Ua and Ub, respectively. In this case, the lottery most often played is the
one with the highest expected utility. Thus, the adaptive decision making in the
long memory limit takes agents’ adaptive RPS-preferences to the expected utility
preferences.
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The relation of the EU preferences and long-run learning is by no means orig-
inal. It has been expressed by many authors, including Cross (1983) and Plott
(1996).
2.5. Discussion
We live in changing environments. Some environments are fairly stationary
and predictable, like changes of seasons. In the course of the human history we
developed certain rules that regulate our decisions about such processes, like the
decision to sow in spring and reap in fall, with little variations. Even the oc-
currence of an unprecedentedly warm winter followed by a cold summer won’t
moves us to act contrary to the rule and we won’t invest our effort in planting
seeds in the fall.
Other processes, like the changes in the financial markets, have a great deal of
uncertainty in future outcomes. If a large drop in a stock price is observed today,
should it be considered as a random fluke, an outlier of a probabilistic model one
uses, or is it an indication that it is time to adjust the means, deviations and other
parameters in the model, or even to sell all the stocks immediately? Most likely,
if we lost a significant sum of money due to this drop, our first reaction will be
to sell to avoid further losses, and we have to analyze more information and do
some non-trivial mental work to find arguments for not doing so, or to confirm
our initial impulse.
Reaction to the current stimuli, as the one just described, is a part of our bio-
logical adaptive response. It has been developed in the course of the Evolution to
let us quickly react once the environment has changed, increasing our chances for
survival. To a higher degree, it manifests itself during the critical events, such as
market crashes or social upheavals, when old rules of behavior become irrelevant
and people pursue minute gains, resulting in a state of chaos, until new rules are
learned or enforced.
It is not unlikely that this response to current stimuli is present in all decisions
that we make, but it is balanced against the past experience. We suggest that it is
one of the main contributors to the deviations of the experimentally observed be-
haviors from EU principle. In this paper we considered a simple decision making
model for such deviations, called RPS preferences. Moreover, we showed that the
EU preferences can be derived from RPS preferences in infinitely long-memory
adaptive behavior.
The point of view suggested here is that decision making is a dynamics learn-
ing process. When placed in stationary environments, long-memory will lead to
the formation of the preferences (rules) that resemble EU preferences. The more
9
advantageous these rules are, the more pronounced they affect the decisions that
me make. This seems to be the conventional notion of rationality. However, “the
irrational part”, the response to current stimuli, is also always present. It becomes
dominating when the environment is changing, and perhaps, is our best choice
when the changes are completely unpredictable.
3. Appendix
3.1. Equation (5)
Consider the stochastic decision making process from section 2.4. Let X i
denote the lottery, either La, or Lb, selected by the agent at step i. It is a Markov
chain on the state of two elements {La, Lb}.Denote by f (x) the probability density
for the distribution of payoffs in lottery La, and by g(x) the probability density for
Lb. The matrix of transition probabilities for the Markov chain equals to
T =


∫
Ua +U(x)
Ua+Ub +U(x)
f (x)dx 1−
∫
Ub +U(x)
Ua +Ub +U(x)
g(x)dx
1−
∫
Ua +U(x)
Ua+Ub +U(x)
f (x)dx
∫
Ub +U(x)
Ua +Ub +U(x)
g(x)dx


The Markov chain is irreducible and both states are ergodic, see the mono-
graph of Feller (1957). This implies that the distribution of X i converges to the
invariant measure, given by the pair of probabilities (p,q) solving the matrix equa-
tion [
p
q
]
= T
[
p
q
]
.
Lottery La ≻ Lb iff p > q. From the above equation we find that it is equivalent to
∫
Ua +U(x)
Ua+Ub +U(x)
f (x)dx >
∫
Ub +U(x)
Ua +Ub +U(x)
g(x)dx, (9)
which is equivalent to (5). In the view of the definition of the probability λ in
(4), the above inequality says that the expected probability to select La, provided
that La was selected last time, is greater than the expected probability to select Lb,
provided that Lb was selected last time.
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3.2. First order stochastic dominance
Suppose that lottery La, described by random payoff variable X , stochastically
dominates Lb described by random payoff Y. Let U(c) be a non-decreasing func-
tion. Then,
Ub = E[U(Y )]<Ua = E[U(X)],
and
E
[
1
Ua +Ub +U(X)
]
< E
[
1
Ua +Ub +U(Y )
]
.
From these two inequalities it follows that
E
[
Ub
Ua +Ub +U(X)
]
< E
[
Ua
Ua +Ub +U(Y )
]
,
which means that La dominates Lb in RPS(1)-preferences.
3.3. Risk tolerance
In this section we show that if VNM utility is a linear functionU(x)= x and La
is a lottery with expected utility Ua = E[U(X)], then RPS(1) certainty equivalent
c verifies
c <Ua,
if the lottery offers only positive payoffs, and
c >Ua,
if the lottery offers only negative payoffs. The certainty equivalent c is defined by
the equation
E
[
ec
ec + eUa+X
]
=
eUa
eUa + e2c
.
Here we using function Φ(x) = ex that determines the stimuli increments in (6).
Consider first the gains: X ≥ 0. Let p(c) denote the left-hand side of the equation,
and q(c) the right-hand side. We have: p′(c)> 0, and q′(c)< 0.Moreover,
p(Ua) = E
[
1
1+ eX
]
≥
1
1+ eUa
= q(Ua),
because function (1+ex)−1 is convex for x≥ 0. Thus, the point of intersection, c,
of graphs of p and q is less than Ua.
The other inequality is proved analogously, using the fact that (1+ ex)−1 is
concave for x≤ 0.
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3.4. RPS(1) preferences are not transitive
Suppose, for simplicity, that VNM utilityU(c) = c. Consider two lotteries La,
Lb, given by random payoffs X and Y that have the same expected utilitiesUa,Ub,
and have the same certainty equivalent in RPS(1) preferences. That is,
E[X ] = E[Y ] =Ua,
and there a $c, such that
E
[
c
Ua+ c+X
]
= E
[
c
Ua + c+Y
]
.
However, if c 6=Ua, lotteries La, Lb are not necessarily equivalent, as the value of
integral
E
[
Ua
2Ua +X
]
can be less, or greater, than that with random payoff Y.
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Figure 2: Certainty equivalent curves for simple lotteries Lx for losses and gains according to EU
(dashed) and RPS(1) (solid) preferences. Utility U(c) = log(1+ .4c)/ log1.4. Given the level of
utility U > 0, lottery Lx pays either $0 or $1, so that U = (1− x)U(0)+ xU(1). If U < 0, Lx pays
either $0 or $-1, so thatU = (1−x)U(0)+xU(−1), with the corresponding certainty equivalents:
$c1 is certainty equivalent in EU preferences, and $c2 in RPS(1). For EU preferences (dashed line)
the curve is the graph of U(c). The function that defines the stimuli, Φ(x) = ex/.2.
It should be mentioned the a similar asymmetry between losses and gains in the
adaptive behavior is observed in the original learning model of Cross (1983).
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